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NO. 45778
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2017-3510

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kim Smith contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
leniency under I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion). Specifically, he asserts the district court
did not sufficiently consider the mitigating factors in his case as it affirmed the sentence, which
exceeded what even the prosecutor had recommended. As such, this Court should reverse the
decision denying Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion and either reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, or alternatively, remand this case for the district court to reduce his sentence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Smith admitted that, though he had remained sober for several years, 1 he broke his
sobriety while on a camping trip with K.A.D. and her son. (Conf. Docs. p.17 (Mr. Smith’s
disclosures during a full-disclosure polygraph, which he passed).)2 He admitted that, as he
became intoxicated, he began to get upset that K.A.D. was not sexually interested in him, and in
that intoxicated state, he decided to force K.A.D. to have sex with him, which he proceeded to
do. (Conf. Docs., p.17.)
He entered into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would plead guilty to rape,
and the State would dismiss another charge and a sentencing enhancement. (R., p.82.) He
entered an Alford plea3 only because his memory of some of the details of that incident was not
clear. (Tr., p.54, Ls.14-23.) The State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of twenty years,
with ten years fixed, and Mr. Smith was free to argue for less. (R., p.82.) The district court also
recounted that Mr. Smith “will waive his right to an appeal unless the judge exceeds the State’s
recommendation.” (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-3; see R., p.82.)
The psychosexual evaluation conducted in advance of the sentencing hearing noted that
Mr. Smith only scored “1” on the Static-99R test (which evaluated the risk of recidivism based
on static, or unchangeable, factors), and that he scored “8” on the STABLE-2007 test (which
evaluated the risk of recidivism based on dynamic, or changeable, factors). (Conf. Docs., p.29.)

1

Mr. Smith had been incarcerated in Washington based on another rape conviction for most of
that time, and had been on parole for five years at the time of this incident. (See Conf. Docs.,
p.70 (noting that Mr. Smith had been paroled in August 2012); R., p.68 (alleging the incident in
this case occurred in June 2017).)
2
“Conf. Docs.” refers to the electronic document entitled “5 – CORRECTED Appeal Volume 1
Confidential Documents Opt,” which contains exhibits such as the Presentence Investigation
report (PSI) and the psychosexual evaluation report (PSE).
3
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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As a result, the evaluator rated him an average (Level III) risk, meaning he concluded there were
multiple issues which were likely functioning as barriers to Mr. Smith’s ability to effectively
deploy pro-social resources and strengths while on release. (Conf. Docs., p.30.) As such, he
recommended Mr. Smith continue to receive sex offender treatment to add to the skills he had
already learned. (Conf. Docs., p.32.) The GAIN-I evaluation recommended he receive Level
1.0 Out-Patient treatment for his alcohol abuse issues. (Conf. Docs., p.14.) The report from a
mental health examination conducted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 noted that, while Mr. Smith had
some mental health concerns, he was not currently displaying symptoms, and so, did not
recommend any additional treatment at that time (though it did recommend reevaluation if
symptoms returned). (Conf. Docs., p.66.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Smith’s employer testified that, during his time on parole,
Mr. Smith had been an honest and reliable worker, so much so that he had been entrusted to
travel to several job sites around the country. (Tr., p.69, L.10 - p.71, L.3.) A Spokane police
officer testified that Mr. Smith had been doing well on his release, and that when he had traveled
for work, he had gone out of his way to ensure he kept the officer informed of his whereabouts
pursuant to the sex offender registration rules. (Tr., p.65, L.4 - p.66, L.19.) Defense counsel
noted that the terms of Mr. Smith’s parole were similarly intensive, and he had been successful
in complying with those terms in the years before the incident in this case. (Tr., p.83, Ls.1-5.)
She also noted that Mr. Smith had been a model inmate since his incarceration, and that he had
been doing what he could to help the other inmates there. (Tr., p.84, Ls.20-24; see R., pp.102-05
(letters of support from his fellow inmates).) Mr. Smith apologized to K.A.D. and her son, as
well as the other people whose lives were impacted by his actions on the night in question.
(Tr., p.89, L.15 - p.92, L.9.)

3

Defense counsel ultimately recommended the district court impose a sentence of only ten
years, with three years fixed, in recognition of the fact that Washington had a detainer pending
because of the corresponding parole violation, and that he was facing a potential life sentence in
that regard. (Tr., p.81, L.25 - p.82, L.9, p.88, Ls.7-11.) Defense counsel also asked the district
court to consider a period of retained jurisdiction so that Mr. Smith could get the additional
treatment recommended by the presentence evaluations. (Tr., p.30, Ls.10-11.)
However, the district court decided to impose a unified sentence of life, with ten years
fixed.

(Tr., p.94, Ls.16-17; R., pp.97-99.)

It explained that sentence was based on its

consideration of Mr. Smith’s prior criminal history and its determination that the only way to
keep the community safe was to incarcerate Mr. Smith. (Tr., p.94, Ls.17-18.) It also expressed
concerns with the risk assessments in the presentence materials because they included downward
adjustments for Mr. Smith being over 60 years old, but he had committed this offense after
turning 60. (Tr., p.94, Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Smith subsequently filed a timely Rule 35 motion. (Conf. Docs., pp.101-02; see
Conf. Docs. pp.158-62 (letter from Mr. Smith explaining why a more lenient sentence was
appropriate in his case).)4 He attached two documents to that motion. First, he provided a report
from a new psychological evaluation which diagnosed him with Adjustment Disorder, along
with the alcohol use disorder which had been recognized in the other evaluations. (Conf. Docs.,
p.110.) Based on that new diagnosis, the evaluator explained that Mr. Smith would experience
struggles in adapting to “life stressors,” and those struggles resulted in an episodic pattern where
Mr. Smith would be fine for a period of time, and suddenly lose control when the stressors

4

Apparently due to the fact that one of the documents attached to the Rule 35 motion was a
psychological evaluation, the motion itself appears in the Confidential Documents file rather
than the Clerk’s Record.
4

around him changed.

(Conf. Docs., p.110; compare Conf. Docs., p.30 (the psychosexual

evaluation noting that there were multiple issues which were likely preventing Mr. Smith from
effectively deploying pro-social resources and strengths).)

With that more detailed

understanding of Mr. Smith’s condition, the psychological evaluator concluded Mr. Smith
presented only a moderate risk to reoffend. (Conf. Docs., p.111.) As such, he recommended
treatment which specifically included “development and maintenance of more effective stress
management strategies” in addition to alcohol abuse treatment. (Conf. Docs., p.110.)
Second, Mr. Smith provided a report from a study conducted by the United States
Sentencing Commission regarding “The Effects of Aging on Recidivism among Federal
Offenders.” (Conf. Docs., pp.112-57.) That study reaffirmed that offenders over the age of 60
are substantially less likely to reoffend after being released. (Conf. Docs., p.119.) Mr. Smith
was 65 at the time he was sentenced. (Conf. Docs., p.38.)
At the hearing on Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion, defense counsel made two alternative
requests. First, it asked the district court to reduce Mr. Smith’s sentence so that it matched the
prosecutor’s original recommendation (twenty years, with ten years fixed). (Tr., p.102, Ls.1619.) Alternatively, she recommended, if the district court wanted to keep the indeterminate term
of life, the district court reduce the fixed term of Mr. Smith’s sentence so that he could
potentially be released from incarceration in Idaho, return to Washington, and resolve the stillpending parole violation there in a manner which would leave open a meaningful possibility of
release on parole. (Tr., p.102, L.20 - p.103, L.5.)
The district court denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion, explaining that, as he had been
over the age of 60 when he committed the instant offense, he was a statistical outlier, and so, the
district court decided the new information in the Sentencing Commission’s report did not justify

5

a sentence reduction in Mr. Smith’s case. (Tr., p.105, Ls.5-10.) It also concluded that he only
did well while in a controlled environment, and so, it decided not to reduce his sentence.
(Tr., p.105, Ls.13-15.) Mr. Smith filed a notice of appeal which was timely from the order
denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.107, 109, 123.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering the mitigating
factors when it denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Sufficiently Considering The Mitigating
Factors When It Denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe in light of new or additional
information presented to the sentencing court. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). A
district court abuses its discretion when it fails to perceive the issue as one of discretion, fails to
act within the outer boundaries of that discretion, fails to act consistently with applicable legal
standards, or fails to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).
“The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). When reviewing the initial imposition of sentence, the appellant must
demonstrate that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any
view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). The governing criteria, or
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sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id.
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. State v.
Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence which protects society and also
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
has also indicated that rehabilitation should be the first means the district court considers in order
to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other
grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). Therefore, in regard to Rule 35
motions for leniency, the district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing
objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were altered by the new evidence Mr. Smith
presented. See Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203; Trent, 125 Idaho at 253.
In this case, the new information in the psychological evaluation provided an important
new insight that spoke directly to the district court’s initial determination that there was no way
to protect society except by incarcerating Mr. Smith – the diagnosis of adjustment disorder. That
diagnosis was important for two reasons. First, it reaffirmed that Mr. Smith is capable of being a
productive member of society during periods of release. That was, in fact, demonstrated by his
performance during his first several years on parole. Compare United States v. Hawkins, 380
F.Supp.2d 143, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining that “[t]he fact that the defendant engaged in
further criminal activity while she was in the process of rehabilitation does not preclude a finding
of extraordinary rehabilitation” or the imposition of a more lenient sentence in recognition of that
fact).
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Second, with the new diagnosis, a treatment plan could be developed to help Mr. Smith
address potential triggering events in a pro-social way, and therefore, help him to avoid the
sort of episodic shift apparent in this case. Essentially, what that new evaluation revealed is
that incarceration is not the only way to protect society in this case, and as such, a reduced
sentence – one crafted to allow the possibility of meaningful release on parole, and thus,
rehabilitation – should have been considered.
The district court also used a faulty syllogism to conclude that, because Mr. Smith had
committed this new offense after the age of 60, the statistics regarding the trend that a person’s
risk of recidivism will decrease as they get older “didn’t apply to [him].” (Tr., p.105, Ls.7-10.)
The fact that Mr. Smith committed a new crime after age 60 only means that his current risk of
recidivism is higher,5 not that his risk of recidivism will not start to decrease in a pattern
consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s study as he gets older. As such, his sentence
should still have been crafted with the understanding that that risk will likely decrease as he gets
older. See Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding an aggregate sentence
to be excessive because, in part, “to incarcerate Cook for, at a minimum, the full determinate
twenty-nine years would be nearly equivalent to imposing a life sentence given the relative
advanced age Cook will have reached in a prison setting by the time he is even eligible for
parole) (emphasis added); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that
sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a
person once rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism). Mr. Smith’s sentence is

5

The two psychological evaluations noted that his current risk of recidivism was not overly
elevated; rather, they found it only to be average or moderate. (Conf. Docs., pp.30, 111.)
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similarly excessive, and therefore, by relying on the faulty syllogism, the district court did not
reach its decision in an exercise of reason.
Of course, just because a sentence is crafted with the possibility of parole, that does not
automatically mean Mr. Smith will be paroled. For example, if his risk of recidivism does not
actually follow the statistical pattern in the coming years, the Idaho parole board could still
refuse to release him. See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005) (discussing the parole
board’s authority). Furthermore, as both parties pointed out at the initial sentencing hearing,
there is an extra layer of protection in that particular regard in this case, as Mr. Smith also has a
life sentence hanging over his head in Washington. (Tr., p.82, Ls.1-9, p.88, Ls.7-11.) As such,
both Idaho and Washington would have to find that his risk of recidivism was sufficiently
decreased before he would actually be released. That double-check eliminates any concern he
might get out while still posing an unacceptable threat to society. Therefore, a sentence which
comports with Cook and Eubank would not sacrifice the other goals of sentencing. In fact, the
prosecutor recognized as much, as he agreed that the goals of sentencing could be accomplished
with a unified sentence of twenty years. (See R., p.82; Tr., p.82, Ls.15-18.)
Thus, when the new information is properly considered alongside all the other mitigating
factors evident in this record – Mr. Smith’s expressions of remorse and acceptance of
responsibility, his mental health issues, his peaceful adjustment to life in prison, the effect
alcohol had on his actions, his amenability for treatment for all the contributing factors, his
ability to otherwise be successful under the intensive terms of his parole – it becomes apparent
that a more lenient sentence would better serve all the goals of sentencing. Therefore, the district
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Smith’s Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his Rule 35
motion and either reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case
to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 21st day of November, 2018.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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